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Abstract: 
 
This article outlines two theoretical and methodological approaches that take a queer 
intellectual curiosity about figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” as 
their core. These offer ways to conduct international-relations research on “the 
homosexual” and on international-relations figurations more broadly, e.g. from “the 
woman” to “the human rights holder.” The first approach provides a method for 
analyzing figurations of “the homosexual” and sexualized orders of international 
relations that are inscribed in IR as either normal or perverse. The second approach 
offers instructions on how to read plural figures and plural logics that signify as 
normal and/or perverse (and which might be described as queer). Together, they 
propose techniques, devices and research questions to investigate singular and plural 
IR figurations –  including but not exclusively those of “the homosexual” – that map 
international phenomena as diverse as colonialism, human rights, and the formation of 
states and international communities in ways that exceed IR survey research 
techniques that, for example, incorporate “the homosexual” into IR research through a 
“sexuality variable.”   
 
 
 
The new persecution of the peripheral sexualities entailed an incorporation of 
perversions and a new specification of individuals….Homosexuality appeared as one 
	   2	  
of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a 
kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul.  The sodomite had been a 
temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species. 
 
- Michel Foucault (1980:42-43) 
 
 
Like being a woman, like being a racial, religious, tribal, or ethic minority, being 
LGBT does not make you less human.  And that is why gay rights are human rights, 
and human rights are gay rights….The Obama Administration defends the human 
rights of LGBT people as part of our comprehensive human rights policy and as a 
priority of our foreign policy. 
 
- US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton (2011) 
 
 
We are unity, and we are unstoppable. 
- Eurovision Song Contest Winner Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita Wurst (2014)1 
 
What is “homosexuality”?  Who is “the homosexual”?  How might theoretical 
and methodological frameworks draw out the relevance of these questions for 
International Relations (IR)?   
I outline theoretical and methodological approaches that take a queer 
intellectual curiosity about figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” as 
their methodological core. These approaches offer ways to conduct IR research on a 
broad range of subjects.  A queer intellectual curiosity – akin to Cynthia Enloe’s 
(2004) feminist curiosity – refuses to take for granted the personal-to-international 
institutional arrangements, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that 
figure “homosexuality” and “the homosexual.”  It investigates how these figurations 
powerfully attach to—and detach from—material bodies and hence become mobilized 
in international politics. In doing so, it challenges the common assumption that 
(homo)sexuality is a trivial matter in world politics.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Separating the drag artist Neuwirth from his creation Wurst is difficult if not 
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The quotations that open this article demonstrate the historically variable  
character of  understandings of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual.” For 18th-
century Victorians, homosexuality referred to sexual practices of sodomy between 
men.  Not only did Victorians consider homosexuality an aberrant sexual practice, but 
they also specified “the sodomite” as a new “alien strain” (Foucault, 1980:53-73)—a 
new “species” called “the homosexual” (also see Somerville, 2000; Hoad, 2000).  The 
invention of a new population—composed of the perverse “homosexual” as an 
“abomination” of normal sexuality—occurred by discursively implanting the 
“perversion” (Foucault, 1980:Chapter 2) of “homosexuality” into the bodies of 
individuals (Foucault, 1980:36).  Subjected to scientific study and biopolitical 
management, this white Western European “homosexual”—with his naturalized 
“homosexual” desire for same-sex sodomy—was pathologized and became subject to 
moral, medical, and psychological correction.   
These dominant understandings of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” as 
perverse persist, even in an era when many increasingly see “homosexuality” and “the 
homosexual” as normal.  For example, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s 2011 
Human Rights Day speech  describes “homosexuality” not as perverse sexual conduct 
but as love within a same-sex couple.  In many circles, the “cringe-worthy” term “the 
homosexual” that connotes perversion (Peters, 2014) disappears altogether, to be 
replaced by “the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered”— “the LGBT” for short.  
Imagined in the image of the white, modern, Western neoliberal citizen, “the LGBT” 
emerges as a normal minority human being within a universal population of normal 
human beings.  What distinguishes “the LGBT” is unjust discrimination associated 
with the object of its love/affection.  Such discourse surrounding “The LGBT” 
naturalizes “homosexual” desires for same-sex love. It domesticates “The LGBT” 
through gay marriage, gay consumerism, and gay patriotism (Duggan, 2003). 
Indeed, it is not uncommon for people to understand “homosexuality” and 
“the homosexual” as either normal or perverse.  This binary becomes particularly 
salient when statespeople and religious leaders mobilize its underlying understandings 
for political gain.  We see this in how some European leaders took up the 2014 
Eurovision Song Contest winner Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita Wurst (hereafter 
Neuwirth/Wurst) as a figure who embodied either a normal or a perverse image of an 
integrated Europe.  Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, for example, 
claimed Wurst signified “the end of Europe” because, “They don’t have men and 
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women any more.  They have “it”” (Davies, 2014).  In contrast, Austrian Green 
Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Ulrike Lunacek commented, “Conchita 
Wurst has a very important message that…has to do with what the EU stands for:  
Equal rights, fundamental rights, the right to live your life without fear, for LGBT and 
other minorities” (EurActiv, 2014).  The figure of Neuwirth/Wurst inspired such 
strong views not because Neuwirth/Wurst could be read as exclusively normal or 
perverse but because Neuwirth/Wurst could also be read as normal and perverse at the 
same time—and  across a number of  different registers.  Certainly, Neuwirth/Wurst 
appeared as normal and/or perverse in the registers of sex (male and/or female), 
gender (masculine and/or feminine) and sexuality (heterosexual and/or homosexual), 
as the name Conchita Wurst in part implies. The name combines the Spanish slang for 
vagina (“conchita”) with the German word sausage (“wurst”) and – read together – is 
Austrian slang for, “It doesn’t matter.”2  But Neuwirth/Wurst can also be read as 
normal and/or perverse in registers that matter intensely in international relations.  
These include nationality (where Neuwirth/Wurst is Austrian and/or German and/or 
Colombian) and “civilization” (where Neuwirth/Wurst is Indigenous and/or Hispanic 
and/or European).  What proves so striking about these figurations of 
Neuwirth/Wurst, as I elaborate later, is that Neuwirth/Wurst’s IR registers of 
normality and/or perversion always function through—and never function 
independently of—Neuwirth/Wurst’s and/or sex, gender, and sexuality. 
These three very different figurations of “homosexuality” and “the 
homosexual” matter not simply because they mark major historical shifts in dominant 
Western perspective on “the homosexual” and “homosexuality.”  They also illustrate 
how specific figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” make it 
(im)possible for Western “experts” to categorize people and geopolitical spaces as 
normal or pathological—and to react to them accordingly.  Indeed, specific 
figurations of “homosexuality” and of “the homosexual” enable and contest specific 
modes of organization and regulation of national, regional, and international politics.   
For example, figurations of  “the savage, the primitive, the colonized” (Stoler, 
1995:7) and “the underdeveloped” (Hoad, 2000) all appear in Victorian colonial 
discourse as sexualized and racialized degenerate and/or deviant “perverse 
homosexuals.”  These figurations played a role in licensing Victorian sovereign states 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Thanks	  to	  Melanie	  Richter-­‐Montpetit	  for	  this	  translations.	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to subject entire colonialized populations to imperial rule, as Stoler’s (1995) analysis 
of colonial educational practices illustrates.  Traces of these figurations linger in 
contemporary Western figurations of “the unwanted im/migrant” and “the terrorist,” 
which inform policies on immigration and security (Luibhéid, 2008; Puar and Rai, 
2002; Puar, 2007).  Figurations of “the homosexual” as “the LGBT” justified the 
Obama Administration’s global support for gay rights as human rights.  This support 
both promised to extend human rights to all “LGBT populations” (Langlois, 2015:28, 
34) and justified the Obama Administration’s monitoring of how some states 
performed against US standards of tolerance toward “the LGBT” (Rao, 2012).  
Finally, figurations of “the homosexual” as normal and/or perverse sparked debate in 
contemporary Europe about how the (dis)ordering of sex, gender, and sexuality in 
traditional binary terms might progress or imperil Europe “itself.”  In these debates, 
European leaders “weaponized” Neuwirth/Wurst (Black, 2014) by deploying  some 
elements of Neuwirth/Wurst’s “unstoppable unity” to enable or disable specific 
renderings of European integration and of Europe “itself,” Yet because there were at 
least three legitimate readings of Neuwirth/Wurst circulating in debates about Europe 
– Neuwirth/Wurst as normal, Neuwirth/Wurst as perverse, and Neuwirth/Wurst as 
normal and/or perverse – attempts to use Neuwirth/Wurst to anchor any singular 
vision of an integrated Europe did as much to disorder (knowledge about) European 
integration as they did to order it/them. 
Because policymakers occasionally employ these figurations to construct and 
legitimate how they order international politics and tame anarchy, figurations of 
“homosexuality” and “the homosexual” participate in constructing “sexualized orders 
of international relations” —international orders that are necessarily produced 
through various codings of sex, gender, and sexuality. Such encodings carry with 
them practical empirical consequences for individuals, populations, nation-states, and 
the conduct of foreign policy.  Viewed through queer intellectual curiosity, a plethora 
of sexualized and queer IR figurations, as well as their stakes for international 
relations, come into focus.  
These include how figurations of Thai “ladyboys” function in international sex 
trafficking and “the asexual Japanese couple” inform domestic and international 
scenarios that link sexual and economic (re)production. But less familiar to IR 
audiences might be the growing body of Queer IR scholarship that analyzes less 
obviously sexualized and queered IR figurations: “the terrorist” (Weber, 2002; Puar 
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and Rai, 2002; Puar, 2007), “the torturer” (Richter-Monpetit, 2014), “the slave” 
(Agathangelou, 2014), “the nationally bordered body” (Weber, 1998; Sjoberg, 2014; 
Peterson, 2014), “the human rights holder” (Wilkinson and Langlois, 2014; Rao, 
2014a; Picq and Thiel (2015), “the revolutionary state and citizen” (Weber, 1999; 
Lind and Keating, 2013) and “the homosexual” more generally (Weiss and Bosnia, 
2014).  Together these analyses demonstrate how, for example, (inter)national 
conjunctures of homophobia (fearing “the homosexual”) and “homoprotectionism” 
(protecting “the homosexual”; Lind and Keating, 2014) complicate IR theories and 
practices about/of war and peace, state and nation formation, and international 
political economy.   
Available space prevents a discussion of each sexualized and queer IR 
figuration and its importance in IR.Thus, I limit my analysis to the three illustrations 
that open this article: Victorian colonial practices, Obama administration foreign 
policy leveraging of gay rights as human rights, and EU Euro-vision debates about 
Neuwirth/Wurst. I do so for three reasons. First, each illustrates a different alignment 
of “homosexuality” with (ab)normality, producing three distinct sexualized 
figurations of “the homosexual” for analysis – the perverse Victorian “homosexual”, 
the normal Obama administration “homosexual,” and the normal and/or perverse 
Euro-visioned “homosexual.”  Second, separately and together these examples 
demonstrate that by placing a queer intellectual curiosity about figurations of 
“homosexuality” and “the homosexual” at its methodological core, this particular 
Queer IR method does more than just “add (homo)sexuality” to IR.  It offers ways to 
map phenomena as diverse as colonialism, human rights and the formation of states 
and international communities that provide vastly different renderings of international 
politics than those that emerge when we include a “sexuality variable” in our survey 
research instruments, for example. 
In this article, I develop two theoretical and methodological approaches that 
put a queer intellectual curiosity about “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” at the 
core of their investigations of international relations.  I develop one such approach by 
mining classic texts in Queer Theory, Feminist Technoscience Studies, 
Poststructuralist International Relations, and Queer International Relations for 
theoretical concepts and methodological procedures. Specifically, I use Michel 
Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (1980) to recover three specific elements 
from his analysis:  putting sex into discourse, productive power, and networks of 
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power/knowledge/pleasure.  I suggest that these elements—together with Feminist 
Technoscience Studies scholar Donna Haraway’s conceptualization of “figuration” as 
the distillation of shared meanings in forms or images (1997),3 Feminist and Queer 
Theory scholar Judith Butler’s theory of performativity (1999), and Poststructuralist 
IR scholar Richard Ashley’s arguments about “statecraft as mancraft” (1989)—
provide the necessary concepts and devices to analyze figurations of “the 
homosexual” and sexualized orders of international relations that are inscribed in 
international discourse and practice as either normal or perverse.   
These theories in combination generate important research questions, but they 
neglect to analyze plural figures like Neuwirth/Wurst that defy categorization as 
either normal or perverse. They therefore lack the tools to assess the sexualized 
(dis)orders of international relations to which such categorizations give rise.  In a 
second reading of these theories – especially Ashley’s statecraft as mancraft – I 
attempt to correct this oversight by turning to Roland Barthes’ logic of a pluralized 
and/or (1974 and 1976).  Barthes offers instructions for reading plural figures and 
logics that signify as normal and/or perverse through what can be vast matrices of 
sexes, genders, and sexualities.  I view those plural figures and logics that are 
constructed in relation to—but not necessarily exclusively through—sexes, genders, 
and sexualities as queer. In doing so, I follow Eve Sedgwick’s description of queer as 
“the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses 
and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of 
anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically” 
(1993:8).  Reading Ashley’s statecraft as mancraft with Barthes’ queer logic of a 
pluralized and/or, I propose an additional lens through which to investigate 
figurations of “the homosexual,” sovereign man, sovereign states, and sexualized 
orders of international relations – what I call “queer logics of statecraft.”  
Some may view these Queer IR methods as additional instruments in IR’s 
conceptual toolbox “for organizing empirical material and practical research designs” 
(Aradau and Huysmans, 2013:2; also see Jackson, 2011).  Others may see them as  
lacking the status of proper or unique methods. They might understand them as a 
queer lens attached primarily to feminist and poststructuralist techniques (Plummer, 
2003:520).  Still others may understand them as performative devices “experimentally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Thanks to Maureen McNeil for this formulation. 
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connecting and assembling fragments of ontology, epistemology, theories, techniques 
and data” through which “substantive worlds” are called into being and are acted 
upon (Aradau and Huysmans, 2013:3, 18).  
Regardless, engagement with Queer IR methods enriches how we analyze core 
IR concerns like hierarchy and anarchy (Lake, 2009, Bially Mattern, forthcoming).  
Queer IR methods broaden our thinking about how to study a wide array of IR 
mobilizations of normality, perversion and stigma (see Towns, 2010; Adler-Nissen, 
2014; Zarakol, 2011).  Scholars might consider how “the homosexual” – like “the 
woman” – becomes another “standard of civilization” (Towns, 2014; Hoad, 2000; 
Puar, 2007; Rao, 2014a).  They might challenge the incorporation of “homosexuality” 
into IR as primarily “a sexuality variable” (Weber, 1998a). Or they might ponder the 
intellectual and political effects of employing critical methods in IR and in 
international politics (Aradau and Huysmans, 2013).   
In my view, these Queer IR methods make especially plural figures and plural 
logics easier to identify and analyze. They thereby highligh the roles of plural figures 
and plural logics in the organization, regulation and conduct of international politics.  
Queer IR methods hold the potential to disrupt intellectual practices that either 
exclude or apriori fix understandings of “the homosexual” and other plural figures – 
from “the woman” (Enloe, 2004; Town, 2014) to “the human rights holder” 
(Wilkinson and Langlois, 2014) to variously normalized and/or stigmatized 
subjectivities (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Zarakol, 2011) – as a condition for the conduct of 
research.   
 
 
Developing Queer IR Methods 
 
 
Discourse, Productive Power, and Networks of Power/Knowledge/Pleasure 
 
Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (hereafter HoS) instructs 
its readers how to analyze modern sexuality by offering four primary 
recommendations: 
1. Analyze how sex is put into discourse;  
2. Analyze the functions and effects of productive power; 
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3. Understand productive power as working through networks of 
power/knowledge/pleasure; and 
4. Analyze how understandings of “the normal” and “the perverse” are frozen, 
without assuming they are either true or forever fixed. 
In this section, I offer a reading of HoS that draws out these instructions. 
 All of these instructions follow from Foucault’s central claim in HoS that the 
organizing principle of sexuality from 18th century Europe to “the contemporary 
West” is how “sex is ‘put into discourse’” (Foucault, 1980:11), e.g., how specific 
meanings of sexualities and sexual subjectivities are produced through specific – even 
repressive – discursive formulations that bring sexualities like “homosexuality” and 
sexual subjectivities like “the homosexual” into being.  For while Victorian 
institutions from law to medicine certainly repressed “deviant” sexual practices and 
sexuality, in so doing they also discursively invented both sexual norms and the 
“sexual deviants” who defied them.  Foucault’s “Instruction 1” follows from this 
observation – analyze how sex is put into discourse. 
How specifically did Victorians put sex into discourse?  Foucault’s answer is 
through scientific discourses about sexuality – a “scientia sexualis” including biology, 
physiology, and psychology – that sought to make “the homosexual body” confess its 
scientific truth.  “Scientia sexualis,” Foucault claims, functioned as a kind of 
productive power to invent “the homosexual” and other sexual figurations like “the 
hysterical woman” and “the masturbating child” during the Victorian era.  This is why 
Foucault offers us “Instruction 2” – analyze the functions and effects of productive 
power. 
How specifically did productive power work to figure “the homosexual”?  
Working on every surface of “the homosexual body” and penetrating deep into “the 
homosexual soul”, theologians, doctors, and psychiatrists medicalized, surveilled, and 
managed “the homosexual.”  Their biopolitical apparatuses produced “the alien 
strain” of “the homosexual” as scientific fact (Foucault 1980:42-44, 53-73). “The 
homosexual”, then, was not a discovery whose empirical reality Victorian scientists 
examined.  Rather, it was through the scientific examination of his “sexual deviance” 
and the therapeutic correction he was subjected to that Victorian society brought “the 
homosexual” into being.   
This scientifically-produced “homosexual” was prescribed a regimen of 
normalization, presumably to make possible his sexual reconstitution from one who 
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desired perverse sex4 to one who desired normal sex, where normal sex was 
represented by the presumptively white, Christian, bourgeois, able-bodied, cis-
gendered,  procreative heterosexual “Malthusian couple.”  But what this regime of 
normalization also did was subject “the homosexual” to constant surveillance, 
management and correction.  This is how “the homosexual” was located in a complex 
nexus of what Foucault calls the system of power/knowledge/pleasure.  This brings us 
to Foucault’s  “Instruction 3” – understand productive power as working through 
networks of power/knowledge/pleasure. 
Why did Victorian society invent “the homosexual,” diagnose individuals as 
afflicted with “homosexuality,” and subject them to processes of normalization?  
Foucault offers several reasons. One reason is that “the homosexual” (like other 
perverse Victorian figures) made it possible to identify normal sexual behavior, 
discursively implant normality in the procreative heterosexual Malthusian couple, and 
circulate social understandings of this couple as exemplary of normal, healthy, moral 
Victorian sexuality.  Thus, a perverse/normal dichotomy produced all manner of 
Victorian sexual subjectivities and organized them socially, scientifically, and morally 
in ways that made the “normal,” privileged heterosexual procreative couple appear to 
be coherent and whole. 
It is only by abandoning what Foucault calls “the repressive hypothesis” –  
“the hypothesis that modern industrial societies ushered in an age of increased sexual 
repression” (Foucault, 1980:49) – that we can appreciate how systems of 
power/knowledge/pleasure actually function.  “Pleasure and power do not cancel or 
turn back against one another; they seek out, overlap, and reinforce one another.  
They are linked together by complex mechanisms and devices of excitation and 
incitement” (Foucault, 1980:48).  What they make possible are figurations of 
sexualized subjects like “the homosexual” as well as “institutions, structures of 
understanding, and practical orientations that make [normative sexualities like] 
heterosexuality seem not only coherent – that is, organized as a sexuality – but also 
privileged” (Berlant and Warner, 1995: 548, footnote 2; my brackets).5  
Foucault takes seriously the question “who is “the homosexual”?”, then, not so 
he can get to “the truth” about “the homosexual” but to understand how systems of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Or, in the case of “the hysterical woman”, desired no (heterosexual) sex. 
5 This is Berlant and Warner’s definition of heteronormativity (1995). 
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power/knowledge/pleasure function to produce the “perverse homosexual” and his 
“opposite,” “normal” Malthusian couple.  This makes possible exploration of the 
circulation of these apparent representations in intimate as well as national, regional 
and international contexts.  For example, we can explore how our knowledge of  “the 
underdeveloped” as perverse and “the LGBT” as normal are in part produced 
by/through some of the same scientific systems of power/knowledge/pleasure that 
produce “the perverse homosexual” and “the normal homosexual” respectively.  In 
IR, we see this in how Modernization and Development Theory draws upon Talcott 
Parson’s structural-functionalist evolutionary sociology to mark “the underdeveloped” 
as “the perverse homosexual” who is the deviant, dysfunctional remainder of social, 
biological, and political development (Weber, 2016).  This is in contrast to how 
Hilary Clinton extents “the normal” to include “the LGBT couple” that is 
reproductive for their nation-state, to refigure “the perverse homosexual” as “the 
normal homosexual” (Clinton, 2011; also see Peterson, 2014).  What disconcerts 
many scholars and statespeople is how Neuwirth/Wurst combines aspects “the 
perverse, underdeveloped homosexual” (e.g., as the rural Colombian Conchita Wurst) 
and “the normal, developed homosexual” (e.g., as the European “LGBT”) at the same 
time.    
Foucault’s “Instruction 4” – analyze how understandings of “the normal” and 
“the perverse” are frozen, without assuming they are either true or forever fixed – 
exposes figurations of “the homosexual” as “the underdeveloped,” “the LGBT,” and 
“the Euro-visioned bearded drag queen” not as true or false but as powerful apparent 
representations whose meanings and functions vary radically throughout history and 
across the globe.   
Foucault’s genealogical method highlights the changeable nature of 
figurations of “the homosexual”, by focusing on different historical representations of 
“the homosexual” and asking “How did these very different understandings of “the 
homosexual” as, for example, the Victorian sexual and developmental “primitive” or 
“underdeveloped” and the Obama administration’s normal “LGBT” come about?”  
Yet because Foucault’s instructions about analyzing modern sexuality and sexual 
subjectivities are very sweeping, it is useful to look to additional theorists to provide 
more precise concepts and devices.  In this vein, I turn to Donna Haraway’s Butlarian 
theorization of figuration. 
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Figuration 
 
What exactly might we look for when we examine figurations of “the 
homosexual”?  Writing in a very different context to Foucault’s,6 Donna Haraway 
discusses some specific techniques of “figuration” that allow us to employ figuration 
as a critical conceptual devise (Kuntsman, 2009:29).  Haraway’s conceptualization of 
figuration – which is compatible with Foucault’s analysis and builds upon Butler’s 
notion of performativity – can help us explore in more detail the figure of “the 
homosexual.” 
Figurations are distillations of shared meanings in forms or images.  They do 
not (mis)represent the world, for to do so implies the world as a signified pre-exists 
them.  Rather, figurations emerge out of discursive and material semiotic assemblages 
that condense diffuse imaginaries about the world into specific forms or images that 
bring specific worlds into being.  This makes figurations powerful signifiers that 
approximate but never properly represent seemingly signified worlds, even though 
figurations are evoked as if they did represent pre-existing worlds.  It is this latter 
move that reifies figurations and the worlds they create, making both potentially “flat, 
unproductive, stifling and destructive” (Grau, 2004:12; McNeil, 2007).  This is why 
we need techniques like Haraway’s to analyze precisely how figurations are crafted 
and employed.  
Haraway explains figuration as the employment of semiotic tropes that 
combine knowledges, practices, and power to (in)form how we map our worlds and 
understand the actual things in those worlds (1997).7  Unpacking Haraway’s 
description, we are left with four key elements through which figurations take specific 
forms:  tropes, temporalities, performativities, and worldings (1997:11).   
Tropes are material and semiotic expressions of actual things that express how 
we understand those actual things.  Tropes are figures of speech that are not “literal or 
self-identical” to what they describe (Haraway, 1997:11). Figures of speech enable us 
to express what something or someone is like while (potentially) at the same time 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Haraway employs figuration to capture ideas about embodiment and materiality in 
the context of Feminist Technoscience Studies. 
7 My explanation of figuration condenses and paraphrases a longer discussion in 
Weber (2015), which explains why there appears to be no queer international theory. 
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grasping that the figuration is not identical to the figure of speech we have employed.  
This is what makes figuration something that both makes representation appear to be 
possible and interrupts representation in any literal sense. 
Haraway argues that language necessitates deployment of figuration and its 
inability to achieve literal representations. This is because all types of language – 
whether textual, visual, artistic – involves “at least some kind of displacement that can 
trouble identifications and certainties” (Haraway, 1997:11) between a figure and an 
actual thing.  Investigating figurations of “the homosexual” as “an alien species” to 
the Victorians as opposed to “the homosexual,” as “the LGBT rights holder” to the 
Obama administration and as both “an alien species” and “the normal LGBT rights 
holder” in the figure of Neuwirth/Wurst allows analysis of what makes these 
figurations possible but also what keeps them from referring to specific material 
bodies engaged in specific forms of sexual practices, specific forms of loving or 
specific forms of (singular) being. 
Haraway’s second element of figuration is temporalities.  Temporality 
expresses a relationship to time.  Haraway notes that figurations are historically 
rooted in progressive, eschatological temporality because they are embedded within  
“the semiotics of Western Christian realism.”  Because Western Christian figures hold 
the promise of salvation in the afterlife, they embody this progressive temporality 
(Haraway, 1997:9).  This medieval notion of developmental temporality persists as a 
vital aspect of (some) contemporary figurations, even when contemporary figures take 
secular forms (e.g., when it is science, not God, that promises to deliver us from evil 
through technological innovation; Haraway, 1997:10). 
But this developmental time may not be applied to every figuration in the 
same way.  For example, because the Victorian “homosexual” was figured not only 
through European scientific discourses but also through discourses of race and 
colonialism (Stoler, 1995), how “the homosexual” was related to developmental 
temporalities depended very much on who it was (colonizer vs. savage) and where it 
was (Europe vs. the colonies).  It was in part thanks to how developmental 
temporalities were racialized (Stoler, 1995) and spatialized (Hoad, 2000) that it was 
possible for the white Western European “homosexual” to be put on a course of 
progressive correction so he could live within Victorian society, while figurations of 
whole populations of racially darkened colonial subjects endlessly oscillated between 
the irredeemable “non-progressive homosexual” and the redeemable “morally 
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perfectible homosexual” (Bhabha, 1994:118), both of whom must live under 
Victorian imperial rule.   
Centuries later, these racialized and colonial legacies of “the homosexual” live 
on, but in ways that appear to be completely different from those of their Victorian 
predecessors.  For example, Clinton’s “LGBT rights holder” is not cast as 
progressing.  Rather, “the LGBT” is a temporally static figure articulated in universal 
moral terms.  By definition, this figure always was and always will be a human being 
like every other human being.  This is what empowers “the LGBT” to “claim gay 
rights as human rights, as every human being has a claim to human rights.   
This does not mean that a developmental temporality is absent from Obama 
administration discourse on “the LGBT”.  Rather, developmental temporality is 
central to Obama administration discourse, albeit differently than it was to the 
Victorians.  This is because developmental temporality is not implanted in the figure 
of “the LGBT” itself.  Instead, it is located in relations between sovereign nation-
states, where the Obama administration uses a state’s progress toward their 
appreciation of gay rights as human rights as their measure of development.  This is 
evident in US policies toward Uganda and Russia, for example (Rao, 2014b; 
Wilkinson and Langlous, 2014).  Striving toward this specific kind of development is 
what it means to the Obama administration “to be on the right side of history” 
(Clinton, 2011; also see Rao, 2012).  
It is, somewhat surprisingly, Tom Neuwirth’s Euro-pop bearded drag queen 
Conchita Wurst that most closely engages with Western Christian realism and its 
progressive, eschatological temporality as described by Haraway.  While 
Neuwirth/Wurst’s  declaration, “We’re unstoppable” aligns Neuwirth/Wurst with a 
modern progressive developmental temporality, as a cis-male styled with long 
flowing hair and a beard while wearing a gown and singing “Rise like a Phoenix”, 
Neuwirth/Wurst has been read as a resurrected Christ-like figure (Ring, 2014).  This 
has lead some European political and religious leaders to debate whether 
Neuwirth/Wurst is a developmental vision of salvation or sacrilege for contemporary 
Europe (Weber, 2016). 
These differences in how figurations of “the homosexual” relate to 
temporalities underscore the importance of Haraway’s third element – 
performativities.  Coined by Judith Butler to explain how sexes, genders, and 
sexualities appear to be normal, natural and true, the term performativity expresses 
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how repeated iterations of acts constitute the subjects who are said to be performing 
them (Butler, 1999:xv).  Applying Nietzsche’s idea that there is no doer behind the 
deed and that the deed is everything (1999:33) to an analysis of sexes, genders and 
sexualities, Butler argues that enactments of gender make it appear as if sex – which 
Butler understands as a social construct –  is natural and normal, and as if particular 
sexed bodies map “naturally” onto particular genders.  It is through the everyday 
inhabiting of these various sexes, genders, and sexualities by everyday people who 
performatively enact them that the subjectivities of these doers of sex, gender, and 
sexuality appear to come into being.  This does not mean that – once enacted – 
performativities freeze sexed, gendered, and sexualized subjectivities and the 
networks of power and pleasure which are productive of them.  Rather, because each 
enactment is itself particular, it holds the possibility of reworking, rewiring and 
resisting both “frozen” notions of sex, gender and sexuality and their institutionalized 
organizations of power. 
Following Butler, Haraway argues that “[f]igurations are performative images 
that can be inhabited” (Haraway, 1997:11).  In the case of the Victorian 
“homosexual”, “the LGBT rights holder,” and “the Euro-pop bearded drag queen,” 
this means these figurations – these figures of speech – through their repetition under 
specific conditions come to be understood as inhabitable images of oneself (or, e.g., 
one’s vision of Europe) or of others.  “The homosexual” may choose to 
performatively inhabit these figurations, or this inhabiting might be imposed upon 
“the homosexual.”  For example, it is hard to imagine the Victorian “homosexual” 
willingly embracing himself as “perverse.”  It is even harder to imagine colonial 
subjects embracing their figuration by Victorians as akin to the “homosexual” in their 
perversion while distinct from the “homosexual” because their racialization and 
“primitiveness” designate them as incapable of progression or slow to progress. 
In contrast, the contemporary figuration of “the homosexual” as “the LGBT” 
may seem to be uncontroversially positive.  Many “homosexuals” welcome the 
opportunity to inhabit the image of “the LGBT rights holder” because of how it 
appears to signify both normality and progress.  At the same time, other contemporary 
“homosexuals” find the image of “the LGBT rights holder” too constraining.  Their 
objections center on how “the LGBT” is produced by and is productive of institutions, 
structures of understanding, and practical orientations that value only 
hetero/homonormative ways of being “homosexual” (in marriage, the military, and 
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consumption) and devalue queer ways of inhabiting one’s sexuality (Duggan, 
2003:50), illustrating a tension between IR conceptualizations of norms as uniformly 
beneficial (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and queer critiques of 
norms/normalization.  As for Neuwirth/Wurst, by both embracing and exceeding 
hetero/homonormativities, his/her/their performative figuration complicates both “the 
LGBT” and a hetero/homonormative vs. queer dichotomy. 
These illustrations suggest figurations are never stable.  For every 
performance of a figuration depends upon innumerable particularities, including:  
historical circumstances, geopolitical context, spatial location, 
social/psychic/affective/political dispositions as well as perceived/attributed traits 
(racial, sexual, classed, gendered, [dis]abled) of individuals in relation to the 
figurations they are presumed to inhabit, an individual’s success, failure or jamming 
of their assigned/assumed figuration as they performatively enact it, and how these 
performativities are received and read by others.  Because no two performative 
enactments are ever identical (Butler, 1999), every repetition and inhabitation 
introduces some, even tiny, amount of difference.  What this means for figurations of 
“the homosexual” is they are never completely frozen, for they are always only 
distilled forms or images that change – even in small ways – through their every 
iteration and inhabitation.  Therefore, institutional arrangements of 
power/knowledge/pleasure – be they heteronormativities and/or homonormativities – 
are likewise less stable than they appear to be. 
All of these aspects of performativity – in combination with how tropes and 
temporalities are deployed – combine to produce the final element of figuration – 
worlding (in IR, see Agathangelou and Ling, 2004).  Worlding “map[s] universes of 
knowledge, practice, and power” (Haraway, 1997:11).  In the cases of the Victorian 
“homosexual,” the Obama administration’s “LGBT rights holder,” and European 
debates over Neuwirth/Wurst, knowledge about these figurations, the way they are 
performatively put into practice, and the power relations running through them 
combine so differently in each case that it is sometimes difficult to remember that we 
are speaking about the same general figure – “the homosexual.”  
The sometimes extreme differences in how the figure of “the homosexual” is 
worlded emphasizes another of Haraway’s points – the maps produced by worlding 
practices are as contestable as the figurations to which they give specific form 
(1997:11).  In Foucault’s terms, this means neither understandings of “the 
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homosexual” nor the networks of power/knowledge/pleasure that produce this figure 
are ever frozen.  Rather, they are products “of the encroachment of a type of power on 
bodies and their pleasures…[that define] new rules for the game of powers and 
pleasures” (Foucault, 1980:48).  These games are played not only in intimate relations 
but also in national, regional and international relations. 
  
Statecraft as Mancraft 
 
Combining Foucault’s insights about discourse and productive power with 
Haraway’s Butlerian unpacking of figuration makes it possible to offer a more 
nuanced account of the figuration of “the homosexual.”   By layering this analysis 
with Richard Ashley’s “statecraft as manscraft,” what comes into sharper focus is 
how states (and other political communities) attempt to freeze meanings of “the 
homosexual” when they enter international games “of powers and pleasures” 
(Foucault, 1980:48).  Ashley argues it is impossible to understand the formation of 
modern sovereign states and international orders without understanding how a 
particular version of “sovereign man” is inscribed as the necessary foundation of a 
sovereign state and how this procedure of “statecraft as mancraft” produces a specific 
ordering of international relations.  I unpack Ashley’s argument by making two 
moves.  I illustrate Ashley’s argument with reference to “the homosexual” in 
Victorian and in Obama administration discourse.  I use the analyses above of 
Foucault, Haraway, and Butler to argue that Ashley’s “statecraft as mancraft”8 both 
furthers understandings of figurations of “the homosexual” generally and provides 
specific IR research questions for analyzing figurations of “the homosexual” in 
sexualized orders of international relations.   
Writing about international relations from a poststructuralist perspective, 
Ashley’s arguments build upon Foucault’s analysis of the constitution and 
problematization of subjectivities.  Yet Ashley adds Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive 
critique of logocentrism to this analysis, based upon his reading of Derrida’s texts 
from the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., 1977, 1981). 
Logocentrism refers to how “the word” –a singular, specific word signifying a 
specific presence – grounds all meaning in a linguistic system because of how it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ashley's use of the gendered term "man" is intentional. 
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positioned as a universal referent that is located outside of history.  In the classical 
age, “God” was the most common example of a “logos” in a logocentric system.  In 
the modern age, as Nietzsche argued, “man” displaced “God” from this logocentric 
position.  Understood as “a pure and originary presence – an unproblematic, 
extrahistorical identity, in need of no critical accounting” (Ashley, 1989:261), it is 
now “modern man” who functions in modern discourse as “an origin, an identical 
voice that is regarded as the sovereign source of truth and meaning” (Ashley, 
1989:261).   
Derrida argues that by identifying one word, one being, one presence as an 
originary “logos” from which all other meanings flow, logocentric systems create 
conditions of possibility for both hierarchies in linguistic systems and specific 
narratives of history. Applying Derrida’s ideas to modern renderings of international 
politics and international theory (especially to Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theory), 
Ashley explains how “the logos” is the “sovereign source of truth and meaning” in the 
manifestation and analysis of the modern nation-state and in specific renderings of 
domestic and international orders. 
Specifically, Ashley argues that in international relations theory and practice, 
“modern man” as sovereign man functions not only as “the logos” of modernity in 
general but also as the foundation of the sovereign nation-state.  This is because since 
the move from monarchical to popular sovereignty, “modern man” has given the 
modern nation-state its sovereign authority.  The state’s sovereign authority that had 
previously been vested in the monarch – as transcendental, as reasonable, as the 
interpreter of meaning – is now vested instead in “modern man”.  To be sovereign, 
then, every sovereign nation-state inscribes a particular sovereign man as an always 
already existing domestic presence as the foundation of its authority domestically and 
internationally.   
What emerges from Ashley’s analysis are three key points that I illustrate with 
reference to the Victorian “homosexual” and to Clinton’s gay right’s holding 
“homosexual”.  First, because the modern sovereign nation-state is intimately tied to 
“modern man”, the sovereign inscription of the modern state is intimately tied to the 
sovereign inscription of “modern man”.  To put it in Ashley’s terms, “Modern 
statecraft is modern mancraft.  It is an art of domesticating the meaning of man by 
constructing his problems, his dangers, his fears” (1989:303; italics in original).  
These are projected into the dangerous realm of international anarchy that sovereign 
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man with his foreign policies attempts to tame.  For example, Victorian modern man 
as “imperial man” required the dangerous, unruly, racially darkened and sexualized 
“savage” as his “colonial (perverse homosexual) subject” to justify both the 
reasonableness of Victorian “sovereign man” and his imperial rule.  In contrast, some 
have argued (Rao, 2012) that the Obama administration’s modern man as “neo-
imperial man” requires the dangerous, unruly, racially darkened and sexualized “post-
colonial (perverse homosexual) state” to justify both the reasonableness of an 
enlightened US “sovereign man” who internationally proclaims gay rights as human 
rights to legitimize his neo-imperial rule.  These examples illustrate why “paradigms 
of man are themselves tools of power” (Ashley, 1989:300).  
Second, this has implications for understanding how international relations are 
ordered.  For, as Ashley argues, “modern mancraft” does not just give rise to the 
modern sovereign state; it also gives rise to modern understandings of international 
order.  For just as the “logos” in Derrida’s logocentric system makes it possible to 
establish hierarchies, the “logos” of “modern man” as the “logos” of the modern state 
organizes international relations according to hierarchies as well.   
These include:  reasonable man/pure danger, civilized/barbaric, 
security/danger, peace/war, domestic/international and order/anarchy.  In this 
logocentric system, whatever can be narrated from the point of view of “the logos” 
and made to “speak from a sovereign voice” is what is valued and protected; what 
cannot be made to speak from a sovereign voice (e.g., anarchy and terror) must be 
violently opposed (Ashley, 1989:284).  Specifying “modern man” in “the Malthusian 
couple” as their civilized, secure, domestic logos, Victorians narrated the deviant 
“homosexual” as an intimate, national and international source of barbarism, danger 
and instability to “modern man” (Stoler, 1995).  Expanding hetero/homonormative 
figurations of “the normal couple” to include “the LGBT couple”, the Obama 
administration in contrast narrated those unreasonable states that do not recognize the 
gay rights of “the LGBT” as sources of barbarism, danger and instability to “modern 
man”, established neo-colonial education policies to enlighten unreasonable state’s 
leaders (e.g., by distributing “LGBT” human rights tool kits to foreign embassies) and 
imposed sanctions on some states that failed to embrace gay rights as human rights 
(Clinton, 2011).  This is how “modern man” as sovereign man authorizes the potential 
use of violence by the sovereign state on behalf of his presumed transcendental reason 
(Ashley, 1989:268). 
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Third, Ashley argues that none of these figurations – of “modern man,” of the 
modern state, or of international orders that we in IR understand as variations of order 
vs. anarchy – are stable or ahistorical.  For the reasonableness of “modern man” can 
always be shown to be unreasonable, just as the order of domestic politics can always 
be shown to contain aspects of anarchy.  To put it in Derrida’s terms, the binaries that 
order domestic and international relations constantly deconstruct themselves, making 
them both unstable and (because unstable) unreliable.  What this means is that various 
invested actors – from citizens to states to formal international institutions – 
constantly attempt to stabilize these unreliable hierarchies and the figurations that 
authorize them so they appear to be ahistorical, given, and true so that they might 
more reliably function in domestic and international politics.  The anxious labor that 
both the Victorians and the Obama administration employ(ed) to construct their 
opposed figurations of “the homosexual” – often in the face of international 
resistances by colonial states (in the case of the Victorians; Stoler, 1995) and by post-
colonial and post-communist states (in the case of the Obama administration; Rao, 
2012; Wilkinson and Langlois, 2014) – are cases in point.  This in part explains why 
international politics is inscribed as dangerous by sovereign nation-states (Ashley, 
1989:304).  For by not ceding to the will of a particular national sovereign man, 
international politics (anarchy) always threatens to expose sovereign man and the 
sovereign order he guarantees as historical and contingent.  That explains why the 
order/anarchy boundary is so highly policed, both in international practice and in 
international theory. 
Ashley’s Derridian analysis, like Foucault’s and Haraway’s analyses, suggests 
contemplating how figurations and the orders (and anarchies) they produce and that 
are produced by them are fixed and frozen as well as unfixed and unfrozen.  But 
because Ashley’s analysis is IR-focused, it additionally provides specific IR research 
questions that allow analysis of both how “modern man” is figured as sovereign man 
on behalf of sovereign nation-states and how specific figurations of “modern man” as 
sovereign man participate in the production of domestic and international orders.  
These research questions are: 
• How does speaking “the truth” about “homosexuality” and “the 
homosexual” participate in the organization and regulation of international 
relations? 
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• What ordering principles of sexuality generate and sustain – and are 
generated and sustained by – figurations of “the homosexual,” and how do 
they function in international relations? 
• How do figurations of “the homosexual” function as instances of 
“statecraft as mancraft,” and how specifically is his normality or 
perversion figured as “the logos” of or against “sovereign man”? 
• How do these ordering principles of sexuality and figurations of “the 
homosexual” as or against “sovereign man” work together to order 
international relations? 
• What do various practices of statecraft as mancraft make possible in world 
politics, and what contingencies are rendered necessary by and through 
these practices (Ashley, 1989; also see Hopf, 2010)? 
 
 
From Statecraft as Mancraft to Queer Logics of Statecraft 
 
The above research questions go some way toward elaborating Queer IR 
research programs informed by a queer intellectual curiosity.  Yet I suggest here that 
they are limited by Derrida’s initial understanding of deconstruction and its 
relationship to “the logos” and “the plural”.  In the texts Ashley consults, Derrida 
argues deconstruction is not something we bring to a text; rather, it is something that 
is inherent in a text.  This is because meanings in a text (or, in Foucault’s broader 
terms, a discourse) are always already plural.  The logocentric procedure that tries to 
impose a singular meaning upon a text or a discourse, then, is always as political as it 
is impossible.  This explains why politics – like the politics of statecraft as mancraft – 
endlessly loops through circuits in which states (or other political communities) 
attempt to impose order onto anarchy.  By critiquing the logocentric procedure as it 
functions in domestic and especially international politics, Ashley’s analysis takes us 
some way toward understanding how “paradigms of man are themselves tools of 
power” (Ashley, 1989:300), not just in specific times and places (as in e.g., 
Kuntsman, 2009; Puar and Rai, 2002; Puar, 2007) but more generally.  For Ashley 
explains how these impossibly singular normal or perverse paradigms of sovereign 
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man attempt to figure impossibly singular normal or perverse international orders in 
their own image.  This is how actors attempt to impose order onto anarchy.   
As powerful as this account is, I suggest it overlooks a crucial aspect of how 
figurations of sovereign man are mobilized to craft domestic and international orders.  
What is missing is an account of how not just a singular logos but a plural logoi 
potentially figures sovereign man and orders international politics in ways that 
construct and deconstruct these figures and orders.  Why this matters in Queer IR 
contexts is because this plural logoi can be understood as simultaneously normal 
and/or perverse as it is enacted through sexes, genders and sexualities as well as 
through various registers of authority (something I will explain further with reference 
to Neuwirth/Wurst). 
A plural logoi – especially a normal and/or perverse logoi – appears, on the 
face of it, to be counterintuitive.  This is especially the case because of how Derrida 
initially sets up “the logos” as the necessarily singular (and presumptively normal) 
“word” that he opposes to the necessarily plural (and possibly perverse) “text.”9   
Following Derrida, Ashley analyzes accounts of sovereign man as the necessarily 
singular (and presumptively normal) “sovereign orderer” who is opposed to the 
necessarily plural (and presumptively perverse) “anarchy.”  While Ashley insists on 
the plurality of man (1989:308), he does not consider how this plural man might 
function as a sovereign man who might be necessarily plural.10  As a result, Ashley 
neglects to consider how the plural might be empowered not just because it is 
foundationally normal(ized) but because it is also foundationally perverse (perverted). 
Ashley’s analysis therefore misses opportunities to investigate how the normal and/or 
perverse plural might function as a possible or even necessary foundation of meaning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In his later work, Derrida relaxes his account of the logocentric procedure.  See 
Derrida on aporia (1993).  For an extended discussion, see Weber (2016). 
10 Ashley’s account of statecraft as mancraft implicitly recognizes and/or logics – as 
they produce modern man and as they produce domestic and international orders – to 
make arguments that deconstruct the figure of sovereign man and the orders sovereign 
man makes possible as absolute, durable or indeed actual.  Where Ashley stops short 
in his analysis is in considering how and/or logics might not always be aschewed by 
those wielding sovereign logics in the logocentric procedure but embraced by them to 
make the logicentric procedure possible. 
	   23	  
in a logocentric system, rather than always in opposition to the singular 
(presumptively normal) logos.  
What might a plural logoi look like, and what might its implications be for 
understandings of statecraft as mancraft?  My notion of a plural logoi comes from 
Roland Barthes’ (1994 and 1976) description of the rule of the and/or.  To explain 
what the and/or is and how it functions, I use illustrations of sex, gender, and 
sexuality first to contrast the and/or with the more traditional “either/or” and second 
to pluralize the rule of the and/or itself. 
The “either/or” operates according to a binary logic, forcing a choice of either 
one term or another term to comprehend the true meaning of a text, a discipline, a 
person, an act.  For example, in the binary terms of the “either/or”, a person is either a 
boy or a girl.  In contrast, the and/or exceeds this binary logic because it appreciates 
how the meaning of something or someone cannot necessarily be contained within an 
“either/or” choice.  This is because sometimes (maybe even always) understanding 
someone or something is not as simple as fixing on a singular meaning – either one 
meaning or another.  Instead, understanding can require us to appreciate how a person 
or a thing is constituted by and simultaneously embodies multiple, seemingly 
contradictory meanings that may confuse and confound a simple either/or dichotomy.  
It is this plurality that the and/or expresses.  
According to the logic of the “and/or”, a subject is both one thing and another 
(plural, perverse) while simultaneously one thing or another (singular, normal).  For 
example, a person might be both a boy and a girl while simultaneously being either a 
boy or a girl.  This might be because a person is read as either a boy or a girl while 
also being read as in between sexes (intersexed), in between sexes and genders (a 
castrato) or combining sexes, genders, and sexualities in ways that do not correspond 
to one side of the boy/girl dichotomy or the other (a person who identifies as a “girl” 
in terms of their sex, as a “boy” in terms of their gender, and as a “girlboy” or 
“boygirl” in terms of their sexuality).  In these examples, a person can be and while 
simultaneously being or because the terms “boy” and “girl” are not reducible to 
traditional dichotomous codes of sex, gender, or sexuality either individually or in 
combination, even though traditional “either/or” readings attempt to make them so. 
While Barthes’ rule of the and/or is derived from his description of the 
castrato’s body that he reads as combining two sexes and two genders (1974), the 
plural that constitutes a subjectivity can also be more than one thing and/or another.  
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For a subjectivity can be one thing and another and another, etc. as well as one thing 
or another or another, etc. in relation to sexes, genders, and sexualities, as there are 
multiple sexes, genders, and sexualities individually and in combination (Fausto-
Sterling, 1993).  This suggests both the limitations of deploying Barthesian plural 
logics as if they expressed a singular rule of the and/or and the expansive possibilities 
of plural logics that pluralize the rule of the and/or itself. 
This discussion makes two significant points.  First, the singular choice we are 
forced to make by an “either/or” logic (e.g., boy or girl) excludes the plural logics of 
the and/or.  Plural logics of the and/or contest binary logics, understanding the 
presumed singularity and coherence of its available choices (either “boys” or “girls”, 
either normal or perverse), their resulting subjectivities (only “boys” and “girls”), and 
their presumed ordering principles (either hetero/homonormative or 
disruptively/disorderingly queer) as the social, cultural and political effects of 
attempts to constitute them as if they were singular, coherent, and whole.  Therefore, 
it is only by appreciating how the (pluralized) and/or constitutes dichotomy-defying 
subjectivities that we can grasp their meanings.  Second, when the (pluralized) and/or 
supplements the “either/or”, meanings are mapped differently.  For in the (pluralized) 
and/or, meanings are no longer (exclusively) regulated by the slash that divides the 
“either/or”.  Instead, meanings are (also) irregulated by this slash and by additional 
slashes that connect terms in multiple ways that defy “either/or” interpretations.  
Importantly, Barthes does not argue that “either/or” logics are unimportant.  
He suggests it is both the “either/or” and the (pluralized) and/or that constitute 
meanings.  Yet he stresses texts should not be reduced to an “either/or” logic, so we 
can “appreciate what plural constitutes” a text, a character, a plot, an order (Barthes, 
1974:5; emphasis in original).  “[R]eleasing the double [multiple] meaning on 
principle”, the logic of the (pluralized) and/or “corrupts the purity of 
communications; it is a deliberate ‘static’, painstakingly elaborated, introduced into 
the fictive dialogue between author and reader, in short, a countercommunication” 
(1974:9; my brackets). The (pluralized) and/or, then, is a plural logic that the 
“either/or” can neither comprehend nor contain. 
It is how the (pluralized) and/or introduces a kind of systematic, non-
decidable plurality into discourse as “that which confuses meaning, the norm, 
normativity [and, I would add, antinormativities]” (Barthes, 1976:109, my brackets; 
on antinormativities see Wiegman and Wilson, 2015:1-3) around the normality and/or 
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perversion of sexes, genders, and sexualities rather than just accumulating differences 
(as intersectionality suggests; Crewshaw, 1991) that makes it a queer logic (Weber, 
1999:xiii; also see Weber, 2014).  For a (pluralized) Barthesian and/or accords with 
Sedgwick’s definition of queer as “the...excesses of meaning when the constituent 
elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to 
signify monolithically” (1993:8) as exclusively “and” or as exclusively “or.”  
Identifying these often illusive figurations, the now queer Barthesian and/or suggests 
how we should investigate queer figures.  Barthes’ instruction is this – read (queer) 
figures not only through the “either/or” but also through the (pluralized) and/or.   
While Barthes offered this instruction in the context of reading literature 
(1974), his queer rule of the (pluralized) and/or applies equally to foreign policy texts 
and contexts.  For “sovereign man” as a plural logoi in a logocentric procedure can 
figure foreign policy and (dis)order international politics.11  For example, consider the 
case of the 2014 Eurovision Song Contest winner Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita 
Wurst.  
At least since winning the 2014 Eurovision Song Contest and announcing in 
her/his/their acceptance speech, “We are unity, and we are unstoppable,” 
Neuwirth/Wurst has been taken up by some Europeans as a figuration who embodies 
either a positive or a negative image of an integrated Europe.  This places 
Neuwirth/Wurst in an “either/or” logic of statecraft as mancraft (Ashley, 1989), in 
which the crafting of a singular “sovereign man” for the European Community 
functions through a traditional understanding of sovereignty as “a complex practice of 
authorization, a practice through which specific agencies are enabled to draw a line” 
between who can legitimately be included and excluded from the political community 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Weber (1998b, 1999) argues “the revolutionary state” of Castro’s Cuba was figured 
as a pluralized and/or sovereign logoi through its multiple codings of sex, gender, and 
sexuality that prompted a “queer performative” foreign policy response by the US.  
Lind and Keating (2013) argue President Correa’s figuring of Ecuador’s sovereign 
logoi “revolutionary citizen” as complexly “homoprotectionist” and/or “homophobic” 
effects wider Latin American policy.  Also see, e.g., Agathangelou, 2014; Peterson, 
2015; Picq and Thiel, 2015; Puar and Rai, 2002; Puar, 2007, Rao, 2014a; Richter-
Monpetit, 2014; Sjoberg, 2014; Weber, 2002; Weise and Bosnia, 2014; Wilkinson 
and Langlois, 2014. 
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this “European sovereign man” grounds (Walker, 2000:22).  In this traditional 
“either/or” logic of statecraft as mancraft, what is debated is whether or not 
Neuwirth/Wurst as a proposed “sovereign man” of the new Europe is/should be 
licensed to draw a line between properly integrated and normalized Europeans and 
improperly integrated and perverse Europeans in a Europe that has been striving for 
integration in one form or another since the end of World War II. This is in part why 
Neuwirth/Wurst’s Euro-vision of Europe engendered such strong expressions of 
disgust or approval.  For example, far right Bulgarian MEP candidate Angel 
Dzhambazki remarked that, “This bearded creature, called with the European name 
Conchita Wurst is like genetically modified organism and won the Eurovision. And I 
wonder, if the vice of our time is that we tolerate the perversity.  I don’t want such a 
song contest for my children” (Kosharevska, 2014:np).  In contrast, the UN 
spokesperson for Ban Ki-Moon commented: 
Everyone is entitled to enjoy the same basic rights and live a life of worth and 
dignity without discrimination. This fundamental principle is embedded in the 
UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Conchita is a 
symbol in that sense and I think it's good for them to meet. [The meeting allows 
us] to reassert his [Ban Ki-Moon’s] support for LGBT people and for them to 
ensure that they enjoy the same human rights and protection that we all do 
(Duffy, 2014:np; my brackets). 
 
Understanding Neuwirth/Wurst as either normal or perverse required 
Europeans to read Neuwirth/Wurst as a figure who is knowable and placable along an 
“either/or” axis – in relation to Europe and in relation to traditional European debates 
about European integration.  And yet, while Neuwirth/Wurst certainly seems to be 
making a call for some kind of unity from a platform that has traditionally promoted 
European integration, Neuwirth/Wurst does so as a figure who defies traditional 
understandings of integration across multiple axes.  These include (but are not 
necessarily confined to):  sex, gender, sexuality, nationality, race, civilization and 
authority.  
For example, Neuwirth/Wurst’s and/or sexes, genders, and sexualities are 
evident in how this bearded drag queen is read through vast matrices of sexes, 
genders, and sexualities that minimally include either male or female, masculine or 
feminine, heterosexual or homosexual, normal or perverse as well as simultaneously 
male and female, masculine and feminine, heterosexual and homosexual, normal and 
perverse.  This figures Neuwirth/Wurst as queer, because he/she/they do not signify 
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monolithically around sexes, genders, or sexualities.  Neuwirth/Wurst, then, is a 
performative embodiment of a plural logoi that functions as a deliberate static which 
confounds and confuses traditional understandings of sexes, genders, and sexualities 
(Barthes, 1974, 1976).  Neuwirth “himself”, however, seems to signify (more) 
monolithically around sex, gender, and sexuality, identifying as a male “homosexual” 
who eschews descriptions of himself as trans* (Davis, 2014)12.  This and his 
statements in support of gay marriage, for example, make him compatible with “the 
LGBT” Clinton describes (2011), whose “homosexuality” can be classified, 
domesticated, and homonormalized.   
At the same time, Neuwirth/Wurst embodies a pluralized and/or logic in 
international politics in the registers of nationality, race, civilization and authority that 
confound a simple understanding of Neuwirth/Wurst in “either/or” terms.  This is 
evident in the various official biographies of Neuwirth and/as Wurst that appeared 
since Neuwirth/Wurst’s selection as Austria’s representative to Eurovision 2014.13  
These bios state Neuwirth was born and raised in Austria, while Wurst was born “in 
the mountains of Colombia” to a Colombian mother and German father and “raised in 
Germany.”  They position Neuwirth as a “natural” European citizen and Wurst as a 
diasporic Colombian and/or German subject who has relocated from the global South 
to the global North.  This has implications for how Neuwirth/Wurst is read nationally, 
racially, civilizationally and as a “sovereign authority.”  Nationally, Neuwirth/Wurst 
is Austrian (like Tom) and/or Colombian (like Conchita’s mother) and/or German 
(like Conchita’s father).  Racially, Neuwirth/Wurst is white (presumptively like Tom 
and like Conchita’s father, because neither are marked as non-white) and/or mestiza 
(because Conchita’s Colombian mother who is from rural Colombia is likely to be 
indigenous or mestiza).  Civilizationally, Neuwirth/Wurst is European (like Tom and 
like Conchita’s father) and/or indigenous and/or Hispanic (like Conchita’s mother).  
All of this puts Neuwirth/Wurst’s ability to function as a singular “sovereign man” for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  As Sam Killermann explains, “Trans* is an umbrella term that refers to all of the 
identities within the gender identity spectrum.”  See 
http://itspronouncedmetrosexual.com/2012/05/what-does-the-asterisk-in-trans-stand-
for/.   	  
13 Must of this information was on conchitawurst.com during the Eurovision Song 
Contest but has since been removed.	  
	   28	  
a new Europe in doubt – whether that Europe is normal or perverse.  This is because 
Neuwirth/Wurst pluralizes by crossing and combining so many of “fortress Europe’s” 
boundaries territorially, racially, and civilizationally because of how Neuwirth/Wurst 
crafts his/her/their sexes, genders and sexualities through “the two hearts beating in 
[the one] chest”14 of Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita Wurst.  At the same time, 
Neuwirth/Wurst’s plurality – not just singularity – in all these sexualized international 
registers make this figure repulsive and/or attractive to statesleaders.  This figures 
Neuwirth/Wurst as both a plurally anarchical force – a potentially unruly threat to 
bring “the violence of the world we live in at the heart of the home, at the heart of the 
national [and regional] self” (Fortier, 2008:60; my brackets) and as a singular 
“sovereign man” upon whom a normal or perverse European order might be founded 
and as a plural “sovereign man” upon whom a normal and/or perverse European 
order might be founded.  This is because Neuwirth/Wurst is both one things or 
another (normal or perverse) while simultaneously being one thing and another 
(normal and perverse), with respect to European integration and with respect to 
integration more broadly.  This makes Neuwirth/Wurst a potentially singular 
“sovereign man” in a traditional logic of statecraft as mancraft and a potentially plural 
and/or foundation of what I call queer logics of statecraft, whose call for unity from a 
European integration platform is far more complex than it might at first appear to be 
(Weber, 2016). 
This regional illustration of statecraft as mancraft suggests that statecraft as 
mancraft is less straightforward than Ashley suggests.  Because the logos/logoi of the 
logocentric procedure can be plural as well as singular by being normal and/or 
perverse around sexes, genders, and sexualities and around numerous important 
registers of international politics, sometimes statecraft as mancraft is (also) a queer 
activity that results in unusual sexualized orders of international politics.  We cannot 
account for these queer instances of statecraft simply by adding the singular 
“homosexual” – as either sovereign man or his foil – to our analyses.  Rather, tracing 
how plural logics of the and/or function in global politics – as queer logics of 
statecraft – is to appreciate how the normal and/or perverse plural sometimes scripts 
sovereign figures and/as their adversaries as well as the unusual orders these mixed 
figures produce and are productive of. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Conchitawurst.com	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Queer logics of statecraft are evident in those moments in domestic and 
international relations when actors or orders rely upon a queerly conceptualized 
Barthesian and/or – an and that is at the same time an or in relation to sexes, genders, 
and sexualities –  to perfomatively figure sovereign man, the sovereign state or 
another political community, or some combined version of the order/anarchy and 
normal/perverse binaries as normal and/or perverse.  Analyzing international relations 
through a lens of queer logics of statecraft directs us, following and then extending 
Ashley’s arguments, to categories that connect and/or break apart foundational 
binaries like order/anarchy and normal/perverse, by understanding the stabilizing 
“slash(es)” in these binaries as multiplying and complicating connections, figures, 
orders and anarchies rather than reducing and simplifying them.  It leads us to ask 
how “the plural” as “a deliberate static” (Barthes, 1976:5, 9) is introduced into these 
binaries to both establish and confound their meanings and the meanings of “men,” 
“states,” “orders,”  and “anarchies” as well as the meanings of “sexes,” “genders,” 
and “sexualities” which are foundational to them.  In a Butlerian vein, queer logics of 
statecraft require us to take seriously how the plural is performatively enacted, 
enabling a plethora of national and international figurations and logics that can be 
(queerly) inhabited.  Following Sedgwick, queer logics of statecraft are attentive to 
how sexes, genders, and sexualities that fail or refuse to signify monolithically are 
productive of and are produced by unexpectedly normal and/or perverse “sovereign 
men,” “sovereign communities,” and sovereignly-ordained orders and anarchies.  
Queer logics of statecraft, then, do not just describe those moments when the 
performatively perverse creates the appearance of the performatively normal.  Nor do 
they describe only the opposite, when the performatively normal creates the 
appearance of the performatively perverse, although those can be among their effects.  
Rather, queer logics of statecraft describe those moments in domestic and 
international politics when the logos/logoi as a subjectivity or the logos/logoi as a 
logic is plurally normal and/or perverse in ways that “confound the norm, 
normativity” [and anti-normativity] (my brackets; Barthes 1976:109; Wiegman and 
Wilson, 2015:1-3) of individually or collectively singularly inscribed notions of 
sovereign man, sovereign communities or sexualized orders of international relations.  
This is not to say that queer logics of statecraft do not give rise to “institutions, 
structures of understanding, and practical orientations” (Berlant and Warner, 
1995:548, footnote 2) that make “sovereign men,” “sovereign states,” and 
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international orders appear to be singular, coherent and privileged.  In this respect, 
they can be akin to sexual organizing principles like heteronormativies and 
homonormativities (Berlant and Warner, 1995:548, footnote 2; Duggan, 2003:50).  
For, by “confusing the [singular] norm, normativity [or antinormativity]” (Barthes, 
1976:109; Wiegman and Wilson, 2015:1-3), queer logics of statecraft can produce 
new institutions, new structures of understanding, new practical orientations that are 
paradoxically founded upon a disorienting and/or reorienting plural.  This can make 
them more alluring, more powerful, and more easily mobilized by both those who, for 
example, wish to resist hegemonic relations of power and by those who wish to 
sustain them (Weber, 1999, 2002; Puar and Rai, 2002; Puar, 2007).  Unlike 
heteronormativities and homonormativities, though, we cannot name in advance what 
these institutions, structures of understanding and practical (dis)/(re)orientations will 
be.  We cannot know if they will be politicizing or depoliticizing.  To determine this, 
it is necessary to both identify the precise plural(s) each particular queer logic of 
statecraft employs to figure some particular “sovereign man,” “sovereign state,” or 
other “sovereign community” and international order, always asking, “For what 
constituency or constituencies does this plural operate?” 
The case of Neuwirth/Wurst is striking, then, because it illustrates how 
Europeans leaders debated – albeit very briefly – a plural logoi as a possible ground 
for contemporary Europe, whether they recognized Neuwirth/Wurst as a plural logoi 
or not.  In discussions about the “new Europe”, both sides in this debate employed 
Neuwirth/Wurst to construct and authorize their Euro-visioned hierarchies of order vs. 
anarchy, as if they were true.  In this way, Neuwirth/Wurst generated not only 
competing sexualized orders of contemporary Europe; he/she/they also practically 
(dis)/(re)oriented and (de)/(re)railed any idealized contemporary European-wide 
vision of an already united Europe. 
It is not surprising that in their mobilizations of Neuwirth/Wurst, European 
leaders attempted to claim him/her/them as either normal or perverse, for this is how 
traditional logics of statecraft as mancraft operate.  Because European leaders failed 
to consider Neuwirth/Wurst through the lens of queer logics of statecraft, they 
generally failed to appreciate what plural(s) constituted him/her/them and how the 
plural and/or logic he/she/they embodies is what made their attempts to claim or 
disown – to normalize or to pervert – this normal and/or perverse figure both possible 
and impossible.   Yet it is this very failure on the part of European leaders to read 
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Neuwirth/Wurst through the plural(s) that constitute(s) him/her/them that suggests an 
additional set of research questions for international theory and practice, including: 
• Can a paradigm of sovereign man be effective without being – as Ashley 
claims the ideal type of sovereign man must be – “regarded as originary, 
unproblematic, given for all time, and, hence, beyond criticism and 
independent of politics” (Ashley, 1989:271)? 
• What happens when a political community like a state or the EU considers 
grounding itself upon a pluralized and/or logoi?   
• Under what conditions might this be desirable or even necessary, and what 
might it make possible or preclude? 
• How might queer logics of statecraft effect the organization, regulation, and 
conduct of international politics? 
 
Conclusion 
 
By placing queer intellectual curiosity about figurations of “homosexuality” 
and “the homosexual” at its methodological core, my proposed Queer IR methods 
refuse to take for granted personal-to-international institutional arrangements, 
figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual”, attachments (and detachments) 
of these figurations to/from material bodies, and the mobilization of sexualized bodies 
in international politics.  This article makes three key points.  It demonstrates the 
historical instability of figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” by 
illustrating how discourses of power/knowledge/pleasure put sex into discourse to 
figure “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” as perverse (for Victorians), normal 
(for the Obama Administration) and normal and/or perverse (for Neuwirth and/as 
Wurst).  It show how figurations of “the homosexual” (might) function as both a 
singular logos and a plural logoi of statecraft as mancraft.  And it makes clear how 
figurations of “the homosexual” participate in both the deconstruction and 
construction of political communities and international orders.   
Because figurations of “the homosexual” and other potentially plural logoi – 
from the variously normalized (Towns, 2010) to the variously stigmatized (Adler-
Nissen, 2014; Zarakol, 2011) – affect the organization and regulation of international 
politics, they constitute important objects/subjects of study in IR.  Rather than 
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detracting from the serious business of analyzing international practice and producing 
IR theory, investigating these figurations furthers understandings of core IR concerns.  
For example, Adler-Nissen’s insightful analysis of Austria’s rejection of stigma is 
complicated by the Austrian state’s embrace of the pluralized normal and/or perverse 
figure of Neuwirth and/as Wurst.  This plural figure calls schemata of stigmatization 
themselves into question. It thereby erodes and displaces how “stigmatization helps 
clarify the boundaries of acceptable behavior and identity and the consequences of 
nonconformity” for states (Adler-Nissen, 2014:149).  Additionally, understandings of 
human rights that equate “the norm” and “the normal” with “the good” and “the 
beneficial” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) are complicated by Queer IR analyses of 
“homonormative” foreign policies—such as those of the Obama administration.  For 
these analyses expose the (potential) violence of not just excluding plural subjects but 
also including plural subjects as singular subjects.  These practical, empirical 
concerns deepen IR understandings of state and nation formation, human rights policy 
and diplomacy more generally.  Yet they cannot be interrogated if IR excludes from 
its consideration plural logoi and logics, or if IR reduces them to a singular logos or 
logic.  
IR methods that attempt to analyze plural figures as if they were historically 
static or singular – either by reducing them to a variable or by analyzing them 
exclusively through an “either/or logic” of statecraft as mancraft – miss opportunities 
to appreciate what plural(s) constitute(s) these figures and how plural(s) make and 
unmake national, regional and international political communities that anchor various 
arrangements of international hierarchy and anarchy.  The Queer IR methods 
proposed here provide techniques, devices and research questions to investigate 
singular and plural figurations, including those of “the homosexual”.  It thus offers 
ways to further IR analyses seeking to investigate how both a singular logos and a 
plural logoi effect the conduct of international politics. 
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